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The House Three-Fifths Tax Rule:




Every man, and every body of men on earth, possesses the
righ[t] of self-government: they receive it with their being from
the hand of nature. Individuals exercise it by their single will:
collections of men, by that of their majority; for the law of the
majority is the natural law of every society of men.'
Thomas Jefferson recognized the principle of majority rule
more than 200 years ago - a principle that has governed our
representative bodies since before the founding of the nation, with
only a few well-delineated exceptions.2 On January 4, 1995, the
U.S. House of Representatives departed from the ancient practice
of majority rule when it adopted House Rule XXI, requiring three-
fifths of the voting members to approve income tax increases.3 In
approving this rule, the House relied on its constitutionally
delegated power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings .. . 4
* Law clerk to the Honorable Sherman D. Horton, Jr., Associate Justice, New
Hampshire Supreme Court. J.D. 1993, American University, Washington College of Law;
B.A. 1992, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. I would like to thank my friend and
colleague, Larry Friedman, for his insightful comments and suggestions. I would also like
to thank Professor Thomas Sargentich at the Washington College of Law for helping me
identify this topic.
1. 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 95 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1965) (emphasis
added).
2. See infra note 32 (listing exceptions to majority rule).
3. H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1995) (enacted as House Rule XXI(5)(c)
and (d)). House Rule XXI(5) reads in significant part:
(c) No bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report carrying a Federal
income tax rate increase shall be considered passed or agreed to unless so
determined by a vote of not less than three-fifths of the Members voting.
Id.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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Slightly more than one month after the adoption of Rule XXI, a
number of representatives, together with individual voters, filed suit
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a
declaratory judgment that House Rule XXI is unconstitutional on
its face.' On August 23, 1995, Judge Thomas Pennfield Jackson
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the suit was barred by the doctrine of equitable or
remedial discretion.6
This case raises a number of significant constitutional and
prudential issues. The plaintiffs called upon the court to consider
the doctrine of separation of powers in determining its proper role
in reviewing internal procedures of the legislature. Moreover, the
plaintiffs' claim brought to a head the explicit constitutional
authority of each House to enact its own rules of procedure with
the unwritten principle of majority rule.
Before a court will address the merits of claims that challenge
procedural legislative rules, the party contesting the rule must
demonstrate to the court that he or she has standing to sue, that
the issue is ripe for consideration, and that the issue is not barred
by the political question doctrine. In order to succeed, the party
must convince the court that the judiciary should enmesh itself in
the internal operations of legislative procedure. The judiciary
traditionally has been hesitant to grant relief to parties when doing
so requires the courts to police the internal operations of a coequal
branch of government. The notion of standing under Article III of
the Constitution, and the ripeness and political question doctrines,
5. See Complaint at 12, Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995) (No. 1:95CV002-
51) [hereinafter Complaint]. In a second count, the Skaggs complaint challenged House Rule
XXI(5)(d), which prohibits the passage of retroactive federal income tax increases. Id. at 11.
In essence, the claim was that the House has the power under Article I, Section 8, and the
Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to enact retroactive income tax increases.
Id. at 11; see also United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994) (upholding Congress's
power to enact retroactive income tax increases). The plaintiffs claimed that House Rule
XXI(5)(d) prohibits the House from exercising one of its constitutionally delegated powers.
Complaint, supra, at 12. It is unclear from the complaint what constitutional principle the
plaintiffs alleged was violated. A full analysis of this provision is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a discussion of the constitutionality of retroactive income tax increases and the
ability of Congress to alter that power, see Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2021-24; see also Pat Castel-
lano, Comment, Retroactively Taxing Done Deals: Are There Limits?, 43 KAN. L. REV. 417
(1995); Andrew G. Schultz, Note, Graveyard Robbery in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1993: A Modern Look at the Constitutionality of Retroactive Taxes, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
775 (1994).
6. Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-5323 (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 1995). For a discussion of the doctrine of equitable discretion, see infra part III.B.
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serve to restrain the federal judiciary from encroaching on the
operations of the other branches of the federal government.7 In
the present case, the hesitancy of the judiciary to intrude on the
operations of the legislature proved to be an insurmountable
obstacle to the success of the plaintiffs' suit.'
Despite a passing reference to the merits of the plaintiffs'
claim,9 the Skaggs court found itself to be an inappropriate forum
for settling disputes over the constitutionality of legislative proce-
dure. The court's refusal to consider the merits of a claim that
House Rule XXI violates the Constituton, however, should not be
construed to undermine the importance of the constitutional
concept of majority rule. On the contrary, the principle of majority
rule was clearly, though implicitly, present throughout the debates
in 1787.10 The Framers were extremely concerned about subject-
ing the will of the majority to the tyranny of the minority. They
established in the Constitution a few well-delineated exceptions to
majority rule, arguably leaving all other issues to be determined by
a majority of the quorum. While a number of parliamentary
procedures, including the committee system, cloture, and suspen-
sion of the rules have antimajoritarian elements, each can be
defended on the grounds that it is intended to preserve orderly
debate and consideration of legislation. The adoption of House
Rule XXI represents the first time that the House of Representa-
tives has made a normative judgment that a particular class of
legislation is undesirable and made passing that legislation more
difficult by requiring a supermajority to approve the final passage
of a bill.
Part II of this Article will probe the debates of the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 and the writings of the Framers of the
Constitution in order to determine their view of the propriety of
supermajority provisions. This part will also analyze the sparse
case law in this area following the view the courts have taken
regarding supermajority provisions. Part II will illustrate that
supermajority provisions like House Rule XXI are of questionable
constitutionality. Part III will demonstrate that even if the three-
fifths tax rule is constitutionally flawed, the judiciary should not
7. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-10, 3-13,
3-14 to 3-21 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing doctrines of ripeness, political question, and standing).
8. See Skaggs, 898 F. Supp. at 2.
9. See id. at 3.
10. See infra part II.A.
19961
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attempt to rectify the situation because it will never be able to
extricate itself from the quagmire of policing legislative rules that
impinge upon majority rule. Part III will also analyze the concepts
of standing, equitable or remedial discretion, and the political
question doctrine, and lay out their rationales and applications to
House Rule XXI. This analysis will demonstrate that, when
weighing the balance between the competing constitutional
principles of separation of powers and majority rule, the danger to
a meaningful separation of powers between the judiciary and the
legislature is far greater than any danger posed by provisions like
the three-fifths tax rule.
II. The Constitutionality of Supermajority Provisions
The conclusion that a challenge to Rule XXI poses a nonjustic-
iable issue should not foreclose consideration of the merits of the
claim that Rule XXI violates a majority rule concept in the
Constitution. The fact that a matter is nonjusticable does not mean
that the Constitution has not been violated; it means only that the
judiciary is not the appropriate forum for deciding the merits of the
constitutional claim."t In certain situations, one or the other of
the political branches may be the only proper forum for deciding
the application of constitutional principles. 2 If or when House
Rule XXI or a similar legislative rule is adopted by a future
Congress, that body will be responsible for deciding the merits of
a constitutional challenge to such a supermajority rule.
A. The Framers' Intent
Beginning an analysis of House Rule XXI by attempting to
determine the intent of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution is
appropriate for two reasons. First, original intent is a lodestar by
which courts guide their determination of constitutional questions.
Requiring courts to probe the intent of the Framers restricts their
ability to superimpose their own notions of the propriety of the
legislative act on the Constitution. 3 Second, the U.S. Constitution
11. See Gregory Frederick Van Tatenhove, Comment, A Question of Power: Judicial
Review of Congressional Rules of Procedure, 76 KY. L.J. 597, 626 & n.145 (1987-1988).
12. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 506 U.S. 224, 235-36 (1993) (concluding that the Senate
has the sole power to try impeachments, and the determination of whether particular
impeachment proceedings are consistent with that power lies with the Senate).
13. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 13-14 (1987) (noting
that the Founders feared judicial discretion and that original intent limits that discretion);
[Vol. 100:2
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is a social compact into which the Framers built the ability to
modify its provisions through amendment. 14  James Madison
wrote, "[If] the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and
ratified by the Nation... be not the guide in expounding the
Constitution there can be no security for a consistent and stable,
more than for a faithful, exercise of its powers." 5 If judges are
free to alter, add to, or subtract from the provisions of the
Constitution, it is no longer an instrument that has been subjected
to intense consideration and long debate by direct representatives
of the people.1 6 Instead, it will embody the will of a small number
of unelected, unaccountable judges. Regardless of the general
merits of originalism, an analysis of the Framers' intent with regard
to House Rule XXI is appropriate because few other sources of
authority are available from which to determine whether the
Constitution embodies the principle of majority rule.
Having established the relevance of considering the Framers'
intent, the central issue becomes whether the explicit power of each
House to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings," 7 is limited by
some explicit or implicit provision of the Constitution. Admittedly,
the Constitution does not expressly state that, except as otherwise
provided, only a majority (that is, more than fifty percent) of the
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
143-85 (1990). But see generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'
CONSTITUTION (1988) (criticizing original intent as an approach to constitutional interpre-
tation); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204 (1980).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. V; see also BERGER, supra note 13, at 14-15,173-91 (noting that
Article V provides power to amend the Constitution, but failure to rely on original intent
shifts that power to judiciary); BORK, supra note 13, at 171 (noting that the Constitution
provides a mechanism for amendment, which should be used rather than defaulting to an
unelected judiciary).
15. 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 191 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also Edwin
Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 9
(1988) (reasoning that "only a written constitution with a fixed meaning could be relied upon
to limit the arbitrary exercise of governmental power"); id. at 11 ("The Framers would have
seen no point in drafting constitutional provisions if the courts did not then interpret those
written provisions in the same manner as they would interpret any other written legal
document, such as a statute, a contract, or a will.").
16. See BERGER, supra note 13, at 8-9; Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 226, 288-89 (1988); Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 22, 24 (1985).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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quorum" is necessary to pass legislation. 9  The Constitution
reads only: "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be
necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be present-
ed to the President of the United States . ..."' The term
"Concurrence" is clearly not synonymous with majority because it
is used elsewhere in the Constitution in reference to supermajority
provisions. 2 Arguably, because the Framers explicitly required a
majority, or even a supermajority, when they deemed it necessary,
the lack of an explicit majority rule provision in the Constitution
18. The Constitution requires that "a Majority of each [House) shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
19. In fact, the term "majority" is only used four times in the Constitution. The first
reference appears in Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, and relates to the number of representa-
tives necessary to convene each House of Congress. See supra note 18. The Twelfth
Amendment uses the term a second time in reference to the election of the President. U.S.
CONST. amend. XII. The third reference appears in the Twenty-fifth Amendment, relating
to succession to presidency and vice presidency. That provision reads: "Whenever there is
a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress."
Id. amend. XXV, § 2. The term is used a fourth time in the fourth section of the Twenty-
fifth Amendment which relates to declaring the President unable to discharge the duties of
his office. Id. amend. XXV, § 4.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3; see id. cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and Senate shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States ....").
21. In reference to impeachment the Constitution reads: "[N]o Person shall be
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 3, cl. 6. It appears that the Framers understood the term "concurrence" to mean a
"combination in effecting any purpose or end, or in doing any work; co-operation of agents
or causes .. . Accordance, agreement, assent, consent." 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 676 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "concurrence" and tracking historical understanding
of that term); THOMAS SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1780) (defining concur as "[t]o meet in one point; to agree, to join in one action; to be
united with, to be conjoined; to contribute to one common event"; and concurrence as
"[u]nion, association, conjunction; combination of many agents or circumstances; assistance,
help; joint right, common claim.").
The requirement that a bill have "passed" the House and Senate may provide more
concrete evidence that the Framers explicitly included the majority rule principle in the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Some definitions of the term "pass" include
the concept of majority rule. See 2 STEWART RAPALIE & ROBERT L. LAWRENCE, A
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 935, § 4 (1883) ("When a legislative bill is
finally assented to by a majority vote of the body having its enactment in consideration, it
is said to be 'passed' by such body ...."). Other definitions, however, define the term
"pass" more generally without reference to the majority rule. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1649 (1961) ("to
secure the allowance or approval of a legislature or other body that has power to sanction
or reject a bill or proposal"); SHERIDAN, supra ("to enact a law").
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leaves the determination of the appropriate number of votes
necessary to pass legislation to the Congress.22
In United States v. Ballin2 the Supreme Court recognized the
fairly broad power of Congress to adopt rules of procedure. The
Ballin Court evaluated the constitutionality of a House rule that
established the procedure for determining whether a quorum was
present so that the House could conduct business.24 The House
rule at issue allowed the Clerk of the House to record the names
of those members who were physically present even if they did not
answer the quorum call.2 The Supreme Court held that because
the Constitution established no method for determining whether a
majority is present, it is "within the competency of the house to
prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain
the fact."26 The Court reasoned that "it is no impeachment of the
rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate or
even more just.""
Given this background and the Constitution's failure to define
either the percentage of members necessary to pass legislation, or
the term "concurrence," Congress arguably has the power to adopt
rules of procedure requiring a supermajority to pass legislation.
Upon closer examination, however, this argument fails. The
Supreme Court in Ballin specifically recognized that Congress's
power to adopt rules of procedure under its Article I, Section 5
power is limifed. The Court held, "[Each house] may not by its
rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which
is sought to be attained."'  The appropriate inquiry, therefore,
is whether House Rule XXI ignores some constitutional restraints
or violates some fundamental rights.29
While the principle of majority rule is not explicitly stated in
the Constitution, certain principles are so inherent in the text and
22. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 486-87 (1995).
23. 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
24. Id. at 4-6; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (requiring majority of each House
to constitute quorum).
25. Bailin, 144 U.S. at 5 (reprinting House Rule XV).
26. Id at 6.
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history of the Constitution that the Framers did not need to make
them explicit. ° For example, pointing to any single provision of
the Constitution that spells out the doctrine of federalism is
impossible. Nonetheless, the notion of federalism is found in the
interplay between constitutional provisions, the text of the Tenth
Amendment, the historical role of the states, and the debates and
writings of the Framers.31 Similarly, the principle of majority rule
is so fundamental that the Framers found it unnecessary to
explicitly enunciate it in the Constitution.
The Constitution explicitly provides for a number of situations
that require a deviation from the principle of majority rule in order
for the legislature to take action.32 When the delegates at the
Constitutional Convention considered a supermajority provision,
they debated the benefits of majority rule and determined that in
certain limited situations, a supermajority was necessary to prevent
rash decisions. The interchange between James Madison and
30. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1239-45 (1995).
Professor Tribe provides a number of excellent examples of words that necessarily must be
interpreted as being part of the Constitution despite the fact that they are not found
explicitly in the text.
A word frequently omitted from the federal Constitution but often understood to
be silently there is the word "federal" itself. Although the Sixth Amendment
provides for a speedy jury trial, right to counsel, and other protections "in all
criminal prosecutions," we know as a matter of structure and history that these
Sixth Amendment protections applied only to federal criminal prosecutions (until
the Fourteenth Amendment and incorporation doctrine came along). Similarly,
the guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus and the bans on bills of attainder and
ex post facto laws in section 9 of Article I apply only to the federal government,
as is clear - despite the absence of any express indication in section 9 - from
section 10's analogous prohibition on state bills of attainder and ex post facto laws
(but not on suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus).
Id. at 1239-40 (footnotes omitted).
31. See BERGER, supra note 13, at 15. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar
Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 701 (1995) (arguing that temporary executive immunity is implicit from the text and
history of the Constitution despite the fact that it is not mentioned in the document).
32. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President power to make treaties
with the concurrence of two-thirds of Senate); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (requiring two-thirds of
Senate to convict President after impeachment by House); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (requiring two-
thirds of House to expel Member); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (allowing one-fifth of House to compel
recordation of yeas and nays); id. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (requiring two-thirds of each House to
override presidential veto); id. art. V (requiring two-thirds of each House to approve
proposed Amendments to Constitution); id. amend. XIV, § 3 (requiring two-thirds of
Congress to remove disability of person engaged in rebellion); id. amend. XXV, § 4
(requiring two-thirds of Congress to confirm that President is disabled).
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Gouverneur Morris concerning the requirement of a concurrence
of two-thirds to expel a member illustrates the debate over the
propriety of supermajority requirements:
Mr. Madison observed that the right of expulsion ... was too
important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum: and
in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused. He
moved that "with the concurrence of 2/3" might be inserted
between may & expel.
Mr. Gov'r Morris. This power may be safely trusted to a
majority. To require more may produce abuses on the side of
the minority. A few men from factious motives may keep in a
member who ought to be expelled.33
A similar dialogue occurred when the delegates debated the
requirement that two-thirds of the Senate was necessary to ratify
a treaty. The delegates considered a number of different options.
James Wilson of Pennsylvania moved to strike the two-thirds
requirement stating, "If the majority cannot be trusted, it was a
proof ... that we were not fit for one Society., 34 The delegates
rejected the idea of striking the two-thirds requirement by a vote
of 9-1, with Connecticut divided.35  As another option, Roger
Sherman of Connecticut recommended substituting the two-thirds
provision with a requirement that treaties be approved by a
majority of the whole Senate.36 Hugh Williamson of North
Carolina opposed the motion, claiming that it would provide less
protection than the two-thirds requirement. 37  The motion was
defeated by a vote of 6-5.3s
The records of the Convention amply illustrate that the
Framers understood the dangers of allowing a minority to obstruct
the will of the majority. The delegates rejected repeated efforts to
impose sweeping supermajority requirements in favor of a simple-
majority rule.39 Moreover, the Framers were careful to limit the
33. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at
431 (Ohio University Press, Bicentennial ed., 1987). The measure was ultimately approved
by ten states with Pennsylvania divided. Id.
34. Id. at 602.
35. Id. at 603.
36. Id. at 604.
37. Id.
38. MADISON, supra note 33, at 604.
39. See id. at 81 (statement of Hugh Williamson), 100-01, 144, 220-21, 546-54; 1
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 554 (Max Farrand ed., 1987)
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use of supermajority requirements to a few special cases, which
they felt merited special consideration.
Another structural provision of the Constitution supports the
idea that the Framers intended majority rule to govern in all
situations besides those specifically enumerated. Article I, Section
3 allows the Vice President, as President of the Senate, to cast the
deciding vote only if the Senate is equally divided.' The debate
at the Constitutional Convention on the position of the Vice
President is sparse." Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 68,
defended the Vice President's ability to cast the deciding vote as
necessary "to secure at all times the possibility of a definitive
resolution of the body." 2 This evidence on the role of the Vice
President tends to support the conclusion that the Framers foresaw
that a single vote margin in the Senate (the Vice President's) would
be sufficient to represent the final decision of the Senate.
Since a single vote majority could control a decision of the
Senate, there is no reason to believe that the Framers intended that
a different rule would govern the House of Representatives.43 If
the Senate were to follow the House's lead and impose super-
majority requirements for passing legislation, it could effectively
eliminate the constitutional role of the Vice President in casting the
deciding vote in situations when the Senate is equally divided.'
Although this evidence supports the notion that majority rule
is a constitutional norm with which the House cannot interfere,
other contemporary writings (especially the Federalist Papers) lend
even stronger support to the principle of majority rule. Although
Thomas Jefferson was not a member of the Constitutional
[hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]; 2 id. at 135-36; 3 id. at 110.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
41. See MADISON, supra note 33, at 575-76, 593, 596.
42. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987);
see also MADISON, supra note 33, at 596 (statement of Roger Sherman).
43. While many differences exist between the House and the Senate, compare U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2 with id. § 3, no apparent difference exists between the process by which
legislation passes the House and the Senate. The Constitution provides only that "Every Bill
which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it
becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States ...." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 7, cl. 2. The Constitution also provides that "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which
the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on
a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States." Id.
§ 7, cl. 3.
44. See Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, On Supermajorities and the Constitution, 83
GEO. L.J. 2347, 2350 (1995). But see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 22, at 488-89.
[Vol. 100:2
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Convention or even actively involved in the ratification of the
Constitution, he was one of the leading parliamentary scholars of
the day.45 On the principle of majority rule, Jefferson wrote:
The voice of the majority decides; for the lex majoris partis is
the law of all councils, elections, &c., where not otherwise
expressly provided . . .. But if the House be equally divided,
semper presuamtur pro negante; that is, the former law is not to
be changed but by a majority ....
Jefferson's passage on majority rule and his reliance on English
parliamentary practice are important in understanding the frame-
work within which the Framers operated. As Jefferson noted, the
English parliamentary system "is the model which we have all
studied." 7 Jefferson further observed that the English rules are
"deposited, too, in publications possessed by many, and open to
all.
, 4
Jefferson's Manual is not the only historical evidence from
which to conclude that the Framers had an intimate understanding
of the meaning of majority rule and favored it. The historical
background from which the development of the Constitution
stemmed was the failure of the Articles of Confederation.49 One
of the major shortcomings of the Articles was the requirement that
two-thirds of the states agree to most major legislation including
tax measures.5 ° In Federalist 22 Alexander Hamilton commented
45. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE
(1801) [hereinafter JEFFERSON], reprinted in CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED
THIRD CONGRESS § 283 (William Holmes Brown ed., 1993); see also id. § 284 (noting that
"t]he Manual is regarded by English parliamentarians as the best statement of what the law
of Parliament was at the time Jefferson wrote it"). Jefferson's Manual is supported by ample
authority, resting on hundreds of years of English parliamentary practice. See id. In fact,
Jefferson's Manual still forms the basis of many House rules today. House Rule XLII, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
46. JEFFERSON, supra note 45, § 508 (citations omitted).
47. Id. § 286.
48. Id.
49. See 1 1787 DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 84-157 (Wilboum E. Benton ed.,
1986) (collecting writings of Founders on weaknesses of Articles of Confederation).
50. ART. CONF. art. 9, para. 6.
The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant
letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or
alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums
and expenses necessary for the defence and welfare of the United States, or any
of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit or the United States, nor
appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war, to be built or
1996]
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at length on the failure of supermajority requirements in the
Articles of Confederation and the dangers of returning to a system
requiring supermajorities for legislating. 1 Hamilton observed that
any time a decision requires more than a majority, it allows the
minority to impose its will on the majority.5 2  He rejected the
argument that requiring supermajorities would add a layer of
protection against hasty decisions,53 reasoning that the real effect
of requiring more than a majority for a decision was "to embarrass
the administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and
to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant,
turbulent, or corrupt junto to the regular deliberations and
decisions of a respectable majority."54 Hamilton continued:
If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority
respecting the best mode of conducting [the public business],
the majority, in order that something may be done, must
conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the
smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone
to the national proceedings. Hence, tedious delays; continual
negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the
public good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when
such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions
things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures
of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally
defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the
concurrence of the necessary number of voters, kept in a state
of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness,
sometimes border upon anarchy.
55
Hamilton concluded his attack on supermajorities by weighing the
benefits of such requirements against the dangers they pose:
purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a
commander in chief of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same ....
Id. (emphasis added). While this list covered virtually all important actions taken by the
national government under the Articles of Confederation, the Articles did allow for a
majority of States to make decisions in any situation not otherwise listed. Id. ("nor shall a
question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day be determined, unless
by the votes of a majority of the United States in Congress assembled").
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 42, at 179-81.
52. Id. at 180 ("To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is always the
case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision) is, in its tendency, to subject the






When the concurrence of a large number is required by the
Constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest
satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely
to be done; but we forget how much good may be prevented,
and how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering
that which is necessary from being done, and of keeping affairs
in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to
stand at particular periods.
56
While Hamilton's Federalist 22 was a specific attack on the
flawed two-thirds requirement in the Articles of Confederation,
James Madison, in Federalist 58, explicitly acknowledged that the
Constitutional Convention had considered requiring more than a
majority of representatives to approve legislation. 7 In a vein
similar to that taken by Hamilton in Federalist 22, Madison weighed
the benefits and the drawbacks of supermajority requirements. He
acknowledged that good reasons may exist for supermajority
requirements:
It has been said that more than a majority ought to have been
required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all,
more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That some
advantages might have resulted from such a precaution cannot
be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some
particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and
partial measures.
58
He concluded, however, that the drawbacks of supermajority
requirements far outweigh the benefits:
But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences
in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general
good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures
to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government
would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that
would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority.
Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an
interested minority might take advantage of it to screen
themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in
particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences.
59
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 42, at 180-81.
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (James Madison), supra note 42, at 351-52.
58. Id. at 351.
59. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
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These passages provide the most compelling evidence that the
Founders specifically considered and rejected supermajority
requirements, except in a few well-delineated exceptions.'
B. Supermajorities and Case Law
Although few cases have analyzed the constitutionality of
supermajority requirements, the Supreme Court recently addressed
this issue in Gordon v. Lance.6 In Gordon, the Court rejected an
equal protection challenge to a provision of the West Virginia
Constitution requiring sixty percent of voters in a referendum to
approve bonded indebtedness and tax increases.62 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 63 requires that a "discrete and insular minority" be
singled out for special treatment in order for a constitutional
violation to occur.64 The Court concluded that no "independently
identifiable group or category" was affected by the three-fifths
provision of the West Virginia Constitution:65 Under this reading
of Gordon, House Rule XXI similarly does not violate the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment because it does not
affect any readily discernable group.'
Yet even if House Rule XXI does not violate the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment, it may still offend
some other provision of the U.S. Constitution. In this way, Gordon
is easily distinguishable when another provision of the Constitution
is invoked because the West Virginia Constitution explicitly
recognized the supermajority requirement for tax increases and
bonded indebtedness. 67 On the other hand, the U.S. Constitution
recognizes supermajority requirements in only a limited number of
60. For additional passages relating to supermajorities and the power of the minority
over the majority, see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James Madison), supra note 42, at 334;
id. No. 62 (James Madison) at 365; id. No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) at 427; Lieber & Brown,
supra note 44, at 2350 n.15 (listing additional references from the writings of the Framers
referring to majority rule).
61. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
62. Id. at 6-7.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5.
65. Id.
66. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (recognizing
concept of equal protection in Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).
67. W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 4.
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situations. 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court, on many occasions,
has recognized that the structure of state governments does not
have to mirror that of the federal government.69 In fact, the
Court has held that states are not required to incorporate integral
structural features of the federal Constitution like the doctrine of
separation of powers.7° No apparent reason exists for states to be
bound by majority rule even if the U.S. Constitution requires
Congress to abide by majority rule in all situations except as
otherwise provided.71 Therefore, just because some state constitu-
tions differ from the Federal Constitution by allowing passage of
legislation by a supermajority, does not mean that the Federal
Constitution allows Congress to impose supermajority requirements
for passing legislation.
Because the Court's holding in Gordon is limited to the
constitutionality of supermajority provisions imposed by states, it
is not directly applicable to supermajority requirements imposed by
Congress on the passage of federal legislation. Nevertheless, dicta
in Gordon tends to support the position that the U.S. Constitution
does not require majority rule for the passage of federal legislation,
but rather allows Congress to implement supermajority require-
ments similar to House Rule XXI. Specifically, the Court wrote:
"Certainly any departure from strict majority rule gives dispropor-
tionate power to the minority. But there is nothing in the language
of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that requires that a
majority always prevail on every issue."72 This bald assertion is
not supported by any analysis of the structure of the U.S. Constitu-
68. See supra note 32 (listing provisions of Constitution that explicitly require more than
a majority to approve measures).
69. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71,
83-84 (1902); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31-32 (1879).
70. Dreyer, 187 U.S. at 84 ("Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of
a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of
persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters, exert powers which,
strictly speaking, pertain to another department of government, is for the determination of
the State.").
71. Jefferson recognized that states deviated from the parliamentary practice of England
and the federal government. JEFFERSON, supra note 45, § 286. While -a full analysis of
supermajority requirements in the states at the time of the ratification of the Constitution
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to observe that the Framers recognized
that the parliamentary principles that governed the federal government were not necessarily
the same as those in the states. Therefore, recognizing the power of the states to require
supermajorities for the passage of certain legislation where the Constitution prohibits
supermajorities is not inconsistent with the understanding of the Framers.
72. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
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tion or the history of its ratification. Moreover, dicta in other cases
supports a conclusion different from that reached in Gordon.73
While United States v. Ballin74 does not deal specifically with
the issue of majority rule, but rather with the question of what
constitutes a quorum, it is perhaps the most persuasive Supreme
Court authority on majority rule. The Court analyzed the following
question: "[W]hat is necessary to constitute the official action of
this legislative and representative body?"75 The Court relied on
a number of authorities from England and the United States that
support the proposition that a vote of the majority of a quorum is
sufficient to constitute an act of the legislature.76 While neither
Ballin, nor Gordon, nor any other case precedent conclusively
supports majority rule as a principle of the U.S. Constitution,
Ballin, through its reliance on abundant authority, tends to support
the conclusion that the Framers intended majority rule to govern
Congress in all cases except those in which the Constitution
explicitly requires otherwise. It is against this principle that we
must measure House Rule XXI.
C. Application of the Constitutional Requirement of Majority
Rule to House Rule XXI
Even if the principle of majority rule exists in the Constitution,
as the historical evidence discussed above indicates, House Rule
73. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955-56 n. 21
(1983) (recognizing that Article II, Section 2 requires two-thirds of Senators to approve
treaties "rather than the simple majority required for passage of legislation"); United States
v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892) ("[H]ere the general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that,
when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body. This
has been the rule for all time, except so far as in any given case the terms of the organic act
under which the body is assembled have prescribed specific limitations.").
74. 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
75. Id. at 7.
76. See id. at 7 ("'When the assembly are duly met I take it to be clear law that the
corporate act may be done by the majority of those who have once regularly constituted the
meeting."') (quoting Rex v. Monday, 2 Cowp. 530, 538 (K.B. 1777)); id. ("'a majority of
those present when legally met will bind the rest"') (quoting 5 Dane's Abr. at 150); id. at 7-8
("'a major part of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum, and a majority of the
quorum may act') (quoting 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 283 (4th ed. c.1890)); id. at 8 ("'For, according to the principle
of all the cases referred to, a quorum possesses all the powers of the whole body; a majority
of which quorum must, of course govern.... The constitutions of this State and the United
States declare that a majority shall be a quorum to do business; but a majority of that
quorum are sufficient to decide the most important question."') (quoting State v.
Deliesseline, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 52 (1821)).
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XXI may not, in fact, violate the concept of majority rule. A
number of arguments can be made that House Rule XXI is, indeed,
consistent with the principle of majority rule. It may be argued that
because House Rule XXI was adopted by majority vote,77 and
since House rules of earlier Houses are not binding on subsequent
Houses,78 House Rule XXI does not violate the majority rule
principle. This reasoning is flawed, however, because the three-
fifths rule is applicable to all tax legislation promulgated during the
entire term of the House. If legislation requiring income tax
increases came before the House for a vote, and the measure
received approval from more than fifty percent of the members but
less than sixty percent required by the rule, the members who vote
against the three-fifths rule would have their interests defeated
even if they voted in the majority for the tax increase. Hence,
forty-one percent of the representatives will be able to keep fifty-
nine percent from enacting all legislation pertaining to tax increases
during the entire two year term of the House, thus undermining the
principle of majority rule.79
The fact that the House can suspend or amend its rules does
not save House Rule XXI from violating the majority rule
principle, because these rules prevent a simple majority of the
quorum who are in favor of passing an income tax increase from
77. House Rule XXI was adopted by approximately 54% (279 to 152). See 141 CONG.
REC. H39,001, 39,071-72 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
78. See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS § 59 (William
Holmes Brown ed., 1993) [hereinafter RULES OF THE HOUSE]. Since every two years the
.House is considered a separate body from preceding Houses, rules of a prior House are not
binding on a subsequent House. See id. The Senate, on the other hand, is considered a
continuing body so that it does not adopt new rules, but rather its rules continue in effect.
Before the adoption of new rules, the House is governed by general parliamentary procedure
as found in Jefferson's Manual, see JEFFERSON, supra note 45, and revised and amended by
the subsequent House precedent. RULES OF THE HOUSE, supra, § 60. The principle of
majority rule, therefore, is controlling on the House before it adopts new rules, if not by the
Constitution, at least by general parliamentary practice. See JEFFERSON, supra note 45,
§ 508.
79. There is also no reason to believe that supermajority rules will be limited to tax
increases. See Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE
L.J. 1539, 1541 (1995) (noting that House Rule XXI sets precedent "for endless proliferation
of supermajority requirements"). Congress may again come under control of the Democrats
who may impose supermajority requirements for reducing welfare benefits, increasing
defense spending, cutting taxes, or other areas of legislation. Therefore, while the three-
fifths tax rule may be an attractive method of preventing tax increases, it can easily be used
against the current Republican majority. This, of course, is not a constitutional argument,
but rather a critique of the approach taken by the 104th Congress.
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circumventing House Rule XXI. The procedure allowing the
House to suspend its rules requires an even greater supermajority
than House Rule XXI.80  Two-thirds of the members voting are
required in order to suspend the House rules and pass legisla-
tion. t  Thus, enacting legislation by circumventing the House
rules is more difficult than actually passing the tax increases in
accordance with House Rule XXI.
8 2
Likewise, House Rule XXI may not be amended to allow for
the passage of tax bills by a simple majority of the quorum.
Members of the House may amend rules in one of two ways.
Under the first method, the Rules Committee can release a
resolution to the floor seeking to amend the House rules."3 The
House Rules Committee, however, does not reflect the composition
of the House as a whole.' Therefore, even if a majority of a
quorum of the House intended to change the rules, there is no
guarantee that the Rules Committee would concur and release the
amendment for a floor vote. Under the second method, the
House is permitted to bypass the Rules Committee by discharging
a rule from the Committee allowing amendment.8 6 This proce-
dure, however, requires an absolute majority of the House (that is,
218 members) instead of a majority of the quorum as normally
required, 7 and consequently has proved to be extremely difficult
to implement. Only two bills have been formally enacted following
this discharge procedure. 8 Once the supermajority rule is in
place, it is difficult to change the rule until the beginning of the
following congressional term. Thus, the supermajority rule subjects
80. House Rule XXVII, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
81. Id.; see also CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE: A
REFERENCE, RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 296-313 (1989) (describing procedure
of suspension of House rules).
82. See Ackerman et al., supra note 79, at 1542 (noting that even if two-thirds of House





86. House Rule XXVII, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see TIEFER, supra note 81, at 314-
26 (describing discharge procedure); Ackerman et al., supra note 79, at 1542.
87. House Rule XXVII(3), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Normally only a majority of
the quorum is necessary for the House to take action. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
88. See TIEFER, supra note 81, at 326 (noting that only the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 and the Federal Pay Raise Act of 1960 have been enacted following formal discharge
procedures). Tiefer has noted that discharge motions have been responsible for inducing the
committee responsible for legislation to release it without a formal discharge procedure. Id.
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the will of the majority to the whim of the minority so long as it
remains in place.
Finally, in support of the constitutionality of House Rule XXI,
advocates of the Rule may point to other antimajoritarian rules and
procedures that have a long precedent in the House. In the House,
a motion to suspend the rules and pass legislation requires two-
thirds of the quorum, 9 and a motion to discharge a special rule
requires an absolute majority.9" In the Senate, a supermajority is
required for cloture,91 and in both Houses of Congress, the
committee structure itself tends to subject the will of the majority
to that of the minority.92 Relying on other provisions of congres-
sional rules and procedure that may violate the Constitution does
not make the three-fifths rule constitutional. The existence of
many other long-standing antimajoritarian rules and procedures
may, however, give the judiciary pause before issuing relief.
III. Prudential Grounds for the Court To Refuse To Address a
Challenge to the House Three-Fifths Rule
A legislator or private citizen seeking to challenge legislative
rules must navigate a number of prudential barriers before a court
will hear the case. Standing and ripeness represent two prelimi-
nary issues that must be addressed before the court will consider
any challenge to a rule of legislative procedure. A third hurdle
facing potential claimants is the doctrine of equitable or remedial
discretion, which is applied in the District of Columbia Circuit.9
Even if claimants challenging a legislative rule can maneuver these
prudential barriers, the courts may invoke the political question
doctrine as grounds for holding that the judiciary is not the proper
forum for resolving their dispute.
The ability of a congressional plaintiff to use the courts to
remedy a perceived harm to the legislative process has been fully
89. House Rule XXVII, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
90. House Rule XXVII(3), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
91. Senate Rule XXII.
92. See Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1167 (D.C. Cir.) (noting the Republican
argument that the committee structure in the House of Representatives causes vote dilution),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Page v. Dole, No. 93-1546 (JHG), slip op. at 15-16 (D.D.C.
Aug. 18, 1994) (discussing how Senate committee structure causes vote dilution).
93. In fact, the equitable discretion doctrine was invoked by the district court as grounds
for dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint in Skaggs. See Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1, 2
(D.D.C. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-5323 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 1995).
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documented." Commentators take varying positions on which
prudential doctrine is best suited to further the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers.9 This Article takes the position
that the political question doctrine is the most appropriate method
for courts to invoke for refusing to hear challenges to legislative
rules of procedure. This is not to say that standing or ripeness are
inappropriate in all situations. In fact, in Skaggs v. Carle,96
ripeness or standing may be the best means for the court to refuse
to hear the case on the merits. The doctrine of equitable or
remedial discretion, although superficially attractive, is fraught with
difficulty and should be abandoned by the District of Columbia
Circuit.
A. Standing and Ripeness
Standing and ripeness are distinctly interrelated concepts.
Both are derived from the Article III requirement that courts hear
only cases or controversies.97 "In its simplest form, standing
identifies who may bring claims that some government action
94. See generally Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L.
REV. 241 (1981); Arthur H. Abel, Note, The Burger Court's Unified Approach to Standing
and Its Impact on Congressional Plaintiffs, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187 (1985); Sophia C.
Goodman, Note, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss Congressional-Plaintiff Suits: A Reassess-
ment, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075 (1989-1990); David G. Mangum, Comment, Standing
Versus Justiciability: Recent Developments in Participatory Suits Brought by Congressional
Plaintiffs, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371 (1982); Michael Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of
Legislative Rules and the "Political" Political Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1990);
Van Tatenhove, supra note 11; Jonathan Wagner, Note, The Justiciability of Congressional-
Plaintiff Suits, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1982).
95. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 94, at 263 (urging courts to retain jurisdiction but
adopt the equitable discretion doctrine in congressional plaintiff cases); Abel, supra note 94,
at 1210 (contending that equitable discretion expands the power of the courts and that the
Supreme Court precedent requires standing analysis to be applied in congressional plaintiff
cases); Goodman, supra note 94, at 1108 (positing that the equitable discretion doctrine gives
courts too much power and the injury prong of standing doctrine should be used to deny
courts jurisdiction over cases. by congressional plaintiffs); Mangum, supra note 94, at 386
(supporting the use of the equitable discretion doctrine by the District of Columbia Circuit);
Miller, supra note 94, at 1374 (asserting that the political question doctrine should not be
used to bar cases brought by private voters against legislative rules); Van Tatenhove, supra
note 11, at 599 (concluding that jurisdictional grounds should be used to bar courts from
hearing cases challenging legislative rules of procedure); Wagner, supra note 94, at 527
(arguing that the traditional standing doctrine should be applied to suits brought by
congressional plaintiffs and that the injury in fact prong of the test should be applied fairly
liberally to allow courts to determine the suits).
96. 898 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-5323 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 1995).
97. William Lasser, Standing to Sue, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 819, 819 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
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violates the Constitution. Other justiciability doctrines identify...
when [claims] may be brought (doctrines of mootness and ripe-
ness)."98 Because of the similarity in analysis between the two
doctrines, it is helpful to discuss them together.
1. Standing.- Standing, as articulated by the Supreme
Court's recent precedent, Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife,99
requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that he has an injury in fact,
that his injury be caused by the defendant's actions, and that the
court can redress the particular injury."° Standing is a require-
ment under Article III of the Constitution,"' which allows the
judiciary to hear only "cases or controversies."1 2 The standing
requirement is justified on the ground that the separation of powers
requires that the courts not stray beyond their constitutional role
of hearing cases or controversies.1 3
When challenging legislative procedure, standing is often one
of the most vulnerable aspects of a plaintiff's case. While the
district court in Skaggs v. Carle did not specifically invoke standing
to dismiss the plaintiffs' challenge to House Rule XXI, the court
did observe that:
98. Id.
99. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
100. Id. at 560-61. There is actually a fourth element to the standing inquiry, that is,
whether the injury is within the zone of interest intended to be protected by the law that the
plaintiff claims was violated. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). Normally, this is not
considered as a factor in the standing analysis in congressional plaintiff cases because the
"constitutional provisions governing the process of enacting legislation or establishing
privileges or duties for one of the houses of Congress have been interpreted to protect the
interests of individual members of Congress." Moore v. United States House of Representa-
tives, 733 F.2d 946, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Judge (now Justice) Scalia took the position when he was on the D.C. Circuit that
congressional plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the method by which legislation
was enacted because government officials do not have "a personal 'right' to performance of
[their] constitutionally or statutorily assigned role[s]." Id. at 960 (Scalia, J., concurring). In
other words, government officials' rights to exercise their "authority are not within the 'zone
of interests' protected by the provisions of the Constitution and laws conferring such
authority." Id. While this argument is intriguing, it has not been adopted by any court in
analyzing congressional plaintiff cases.
101. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
102. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
103. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine
of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881,
882 (1983).
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Whether expressed in terms of a failure of standing, or "equita-
ble" or "remedial" discretion, the fundamental consideration
... is one of prudent judicial self-restraint: federal courts
should generally refrain, as a matter of policy, from intruding
in" the name of the Constitution upon the internal affairs of
Congress at the behest of lawmakers who have failed to prevail
in the political process.""
To ensure that courts refrain from deciding cases unless an
actual case or controversy is at issue, the Supreme Court has
established three factors that must be met in order for a party to
have standing."°5 The first element of the standing doctrine
requires that the injury in fact be "concrete and particularized" and
"actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."''' 6 The
second element dictates that the injury be "'fairly ... traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant .... ""I0 Finally, under
the third element, the court must be able to give the plaintiff relief
from the allegedly illegal conduct. 8 In a recent application of
these elements, the District Court for the District of Columbia in
Page v. Dole" held that the plaintiff challenging the Senate
cloture rule did not have standing to sue because he failed to meet
all three grounds for establishing standing.' Much of the court's
reasoning in that case is applicable to Skaggs.
With regard to the first element of standing, injury in fact, the
Page plaintiff relied on two types of injury, only one of which
applies to the plaintiffs in Skaggs. The first injury the plaintiff in
Page claimed was that the legislation he supported was not brought
to a vote because of the Senate cloture rule.' The court ac-
knowledged that the plaintiff presented a fairly specific type of
injury.1 The plaintiffs in Skaggs, however, can not prove that
any tax legislation that they supported failed because of House
104. Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-5323 (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 1995).
105. Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
106. Id. at 560.
107. Id. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41
(1976)).
108. See id. at 561.
109. No. 93-1546 (JHG) (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1994).
110. Id. at 17.
111. Id. at 8.
112. Id.
[Vol. 100:2
1996] THREE-FIFTHS TAX RULE
Rule XXI. t 13  Consequently, the Skaggs plaintiffs will be forced
to rely on the second type of injury described in Page. In Page, the
plaintiff asserted that even though no particular legislation he
supported was brought to the Senate for a vote, he incurred an
injury because his vote was diluted."t 4 The court, however, found
this claim "vague, conjectural, and hypothetical.""' 5 Similar to
the plaintiff in Page, the plaintiffs in Skaggs can point to no
"particular bills or proposals that will be the subject of future
allegedly unconstitutional [conduct]. '' 16
Even if the Skaggs plaintiffs could demonstrate that particular
tax legislation they supported was approved by a simple majority
of the House, but not by a three-fifths majority, it is still unclear
whether the plaintiffs would have standing to challenge the House
Rule. In order to establish standing, the plaintiffs would have had
to prove the final element of the standing doctrine - redressability.
Thus, even if the court struck down House Rule XXI and held that
tax legislation that had received a simple majority was considered
to have passed the House, the legislation might still fail in the
Senate or be vetoed by the President. In either case, the court's
113. See generally Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 7-13, Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995) [hereinafter Defendant's
Reply]. The plaintiffs attempt to rely on the defeat of the Mink Amendment to H.R. 2, see
141 CONG. REC. H3742, H3761 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995), the only measure considered by
the House in which Rule XXI was invoked, to bolster their claim that they have standing.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 11-13, Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995) [hereinafter Plaintiffs'
Opposition]. There is absolutely no evidence that this measure would have passed without
Rule XXI. In fact, only 20% of the members voted for the measure. See Defendant's Reply,
supra, at 7-13.
The plaintiffs contend that Rule XXI reduced their votes from 44% to 37% of the
votes necessary for passage of the legislation. Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra, at 12. It is hard
to imagine, however, how the plaintiffs suffered a concrete injury by having legislation
defeated by a greater margin than it otherwise would have been under majority rule.
Finally, the plaintiffs point to the Tax Fairness and Deficit Reduction Act of 1995,
H.R. 1215, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), as evidence that tax increase legislation has already
passed the House with a simply majority vote. Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra, at 13. While
H.R. 1215 was approved by a vote of 57% in favor to 43% against, see 141 CONG. REC.
H4318-19 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995), the Chairman of the House Rules Committee, Gerald
B.H. Solomon, ruled that Rule XXI was not applicable to the bill. Id. at H4315-17. In fact,
the controversy surrounding this ruling by Chairman Solomon supports the contention that
a challenge to Rule XXI is not yet ripe. See infra note 134.
114. Page v. Dole, No. 93-1546 (JGH), slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1994).
115. Id. at 11.
116. Id. The two bills that the plaintiffs in Skaggs reference in order to support their
contention that they have standing to challenge Rule XXI are inapplicable. See supra note
113 (discussing specific legislation in which Rule XXI has been invoked).
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action would not cause the legislation that the plaintiffs supported
to become law. As a result, the plaintiffs in Skaggs could not show
that their injury is redressable by the court, thereby failing the final
element of standing.
Arguably, even if the plaintiffs are unable to point to particular
legislation that failed because of House Rule XXI, the court should
still grant standing."7  In Vander Jagt v. O'Neill,"' the District
of Columbia Circuit held that Republican Congressmen who
claimed that their voting power had been diluted by under-
representation on House committees had suffered sufficient injury
to establish standing."9  Similarly, in Michel v. Anderson,"2
private voters claimed that a House Rule, which allowed delegates
from territories of the United States to vote in the Committee of
the Whole, resulted in the diminution of their votes. 121 The
District of Columbia Circuit held that the mere fact that the same
injury was suffered by all voters in all states "does not make it an
'abstract' one."122
In essence, the plaintiffs in Skaggs alleged a similar injury, that
is, dilution of their voting power in Congress." Reliance on
Vander Jagt and Michel, however, is misplaced. In Vander Jagt and
Michel, the Congressmen and their constituents suffered a viable
injury - the actual diminution of their voting authority - on a
day-to-day basis. 24 When a party cannot show either that partic-
ular legislation has been defeated because of a legislative rule like
Rule XXI, or any other concrete type of injury, the standing
117. Lieber & Brown, supra note 44, at 2352-55 (arguing that courts should grant
standing to challenge House Rule XXI).
118. 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
119. Id. at 1170.
120. 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
121. Id. at 625 (challenging House Rule XII, cl. 2). The Committee of the Whole is "a
committee composed of all members of the House through which all public bills affecting
revenue and spending proceed, and which shapes, to a very great extent, the final forms of
bills that pass the House." Id.
122. Id. at 626.
123. See Complaint, supra note 5, para. 31, at 9 (alleging that each Member's voting
power on tax increase legislation has fallen from 1/218th to 1/261st of the voting power as
a result of House Rule XXI); cf Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1167 (alleging that although
Republicans constituted 44.14% of the whole House, they received only 40% of seats on the
Budget and Appropriations Committees, only 34.29% of seats on the Ways and Means
Committee, and only 31.25% of seats on the Rules Committee).
124. See Michel, 14 F.3d at 625; Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1170.
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doctrine requires that the party resort to a forum other than the
judiciary for resolution of his complaint.
While serious separation of powers problems arise when
ordinary voters request the judiciary to adjudicate the application
of congressional rules of procedure, even more serious concerns are
raised when members of Congress seek relief from congressional
rules from the judiciary. Therefore, a number of commentators
have urged courts to adopt a more rigid standing rule for suits
brought by congressional plaintiffs.2 This more rigid standing
analysis attempts to manipulate the injury factor. Under this
interpretation of the standing doctrine, "once it is determined that
this is a suit by congressmen, pertaining to their respective
legislative powers, that is an end of the matter."' 6 The problem
with an approach to standing that narrows the definition of
injury" is that it ignores the fact that a "case or controversy"
may be established by the plaintiff's suit." s This stricter approach
to standing "is really making a political question argument in the
guise of standing analysis."'29
2. Ripeness.- The concept of ripeness is another trouble
spot for legislators or voters challenging legislative rules that have
not yet caused the defeat of legislation. The seminal case analyzing
the ripeness doctrine is Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner."3  In
Abbott the Supreme Court noted that the doctrine's "basic
rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
... ,,13 In addition, the ripeness doctrine requires that a particu-
125. See supra notes 94-95 (listing articles and comments that take various positions on
congressional plaintiff suits).
126. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946,963 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Id.; Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1177-85 (Bork, J., concurring).
128. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
[W]hen a proper dispute arises concerning the respective constitutional functions
of the various branches of the government, "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). Courts may not avoid resolving
genuine cases or controversies - those of a type which are traditionally justiciable
- simply because one or both parties are coordinate branches.
Barnes, 759 F.2d at 26-27 (citation omitted).
129. Moore, 733 F.2d at 953.
130. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
131. Id. at 148.
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lar decision become final "and its effects felt in a concrete way by
the challenging parties." '32 In other words, "[d]ismissal for lack
of ripeness is appropriate where '[n]othing in the record shows that
appellants have suffered any injury thus far, and the law's future
effect remains wholly speculative."'133
A challenge to Rule XXI should not be considered ripe until
the rule has been successfully invoked to prevent the passage of
legislation by a simple majority of the House of Representatives.
To consider the issue ripe for judicial determination before that
point would be improper because the rule may be rejected by a
subsequent Congress before the rule actually prevents the passage
of tax legislation that would be approved by a majority."3  At
some point, however, the issue may be ripe for consideration when
"the political branches reach a constitutional impasse." '135 Yet
even if the issue becomes ripe for adjudication, other issues, such
as the justiciability of the matter, must be addressed.
132. Id. at 148-49.
133. Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1290 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (quoting Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 589 (1972)).
134. Cf Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (refusing to address a
challenge under the Twenty-seventh Amendment to a quadrennial pay adjustment because
Congress may amend the statute to comply with the Constitution before the pay raise takes
effect). In fact, the controversy surrounding the application of Rule XXI to H.R. 1215, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), illustrates that a challenge to the rule is not ripe. A parliamentary
inquiry was made as to the application of Rule XXI to H.R. 1215. See 141 CONG. REC.
H4315 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995). While H.R. 1215 was ruled not to be a measure to increase
income taxes, id., the scope of Rule XXI remains in question. The House Parliamentarian
noted that "'the first essential question yet to be properly determined' is whether the new
rule applies discretely to individual provisions of a bill, or instead, to the integrated whole
formed by related provision." Lauren Darling, House Parliamentarian Has Questions About
Supermajority Rule for Tax Hikes, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 113, at G-6 (June 13, 1995).
Moreover, the Chairman of the House Rules Committee observed that "'this is still not a
matter which has been fully and finally resolved,' and this is 'an issue on which interpreta-
tions, guidelines, policies, and precedents will evolve as the chair is presented with new
situations and questions."' Id. at G-7.
135. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
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B. Equitable or Remedial Discretion
136
The doctrine of remedial discretion, as adopted by the District
of Columbia Circuit in Riegle v. Federal Open Market Commit-
tee, t37 has its origins in an article written by then-Chief Judge Carl
McGowan of the District of Columbia Circuit.138  The district
court relied upon this doctrine in dismissing the challenge to Rule
XXI in Skaggs v. Carle.t 39 Judge McGowan devised the doctrine
because he "found the standing, political question, and ripeness
doctrines 'notoriously difficult to understand and to apply, and
[failing] in varying degrees to account for the underlying separa-
tion-of-powers concerns.""' 4  The court in Riegle adopted this
rationale141 and articulated the following test for remedial discre-
tion:
When a congressional plaintiff brings a suit involving
circumstances in which legislative redress is not available or a
private plaintiff would likely not qualify for standing, the court
would be counseled under our standard to hear the case.
...We would welcome congressional plaintiff actions
involving non-frivolous claims of unconstitutional action which,
because they could not be brought by a private plaintiff and are
not subject to legislative redress, would go unreviewed unless
brought by a legislative plaintiff. 4
The District of Columbia Circuit distinguished, however, the
situation in which legislative action could redress the congressional
plaintiff's injury.43 In that instance, the court recommended
judicial restraint, and concluded that private plaintiffs were the
136. The doctrine was initially called equitable discretion by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir.), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981), because the parties in that case sought only injunctive relief.
Id. at 876. The court changed the name of the concept to remedial discretion in Vander Jagt
v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1175 n.25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983), in order
to reflect the fact that the parties in that case sought both injunctive and declaratory relief.
Id. The doctrine will be referred to in this Article as remedial discretion.
137. 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
138. McGowan, supra note 94.
139. 898F. Supp.l (D.D.C. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-5323 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 1995).
140. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting McGowan, supra
note 94, at 244).
141. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 878 n.5.
142. Id. at 882.
143. Id. at 881.
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more appropriate parties to challenge legislative actions.144 Thus,
the court determined that in either situation, that is, when private
parties may bring an action because legislative redress is available
to congressional plaintiffs, or when congressional plaintiffs may
bring an action because legislative redress is not available, standing
would not raise separation of powers concerns.145 As a result, the
court would be obliged to reach the merits of the claim.1"
The doctrine of remedial discretion has never been endorsed
by the Supreme Court 147 and has been subject to withering at-
tacks.1" The fundamental flaw in the doctrine of remedial discre-
tion is the assumption that all constitutional violations must be
subject to judicial remedy.149 The Supreme Court has rejected
the notion that all constitutional violations ultimately must be
resolved by the judiciary:
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate
this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence
of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives
support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to
144. Id.
145. Id. at 881, 882.
146. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881, 882.
147. Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("We are fully mindful,
however, that this circuit's recently minted doctrine of equitable discretion has not even been
addressed, much less endorsed, by the Supreme Court.").
148. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
At bottom, equitable discretion is a lawless doctrine that is the antithesis of the
"principled decisionmaking" that was invoked to justify its manufacture. A
doctrine of remedial discretion more than "suggests the sort of rudderless
adjudication that courts strive to avoid," - it is rudderless adjudication.
Ultimately, the doctrine of equitable discretion makes cases turn on nothing
more than the sensitivity of a particular trio of judges.
Barnes, 759 F.2d at 61; see also Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d
946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending that standing doctrine is
distorted by the "ad-hoc ery of 'remedial discretion"'). "The chancellor's foot has never
been considered a particularly satisfactory unit of measure, even for matters of relatively
small public consequence. It is regrettable to see it applied, now for the fourth time in a
panel opinion of this court ...." Moore, 733 F.2d at 956 (Scalia, J. concurring).
149. See Riegle, 656 F.2d at 882 (contending that "there are no prudential considerations
or separation-of-powers concerns which would outweigh the mandate of the federal courts
to 'say what the law is"' when "non-frivolous claims of unconstitutional action... would go
unreviewed unless brought by a legislative plaintiff").
[Vol. 100:2
THREE-FIFTHS TAX RULE
the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political pro-
cess.
150
Furthermore, despite the District of Columbia Circuit's claims
that the prudential doctrines of ripeness, standing, and political
question are insufficient to address separation of powers con-
cerns,151 the genesis of the remedial discretion doctrine boils
down to the judiciary's reluctance to relinquish its power to the
other coequal branches of government. It is entirely unclear why
ripeness, standing, and the political question doctrine are not
"sufficiently catholic in formulation or flexible in application to
resolve the prudential issues arising in congressional plaintiff
cases." 152  In fact, the political question doctrine, with its six
factors,153 is extremely catholic in formulation. The crux of the
problem appears to be that the political question doctrine is not
flexible because it prohibits courts from deciding particular cases
involving the political process. In other words, the remedial
discretion doctrine reflects the unwillingness of the District of
Columbia Circuit to relinquish its ability to adjudicate a class of
cases, while standing and the political question doctrine require that
the court forego all authority to hear such cases.1 4
A major problem with both standing and the doctrine of
remedial discretion is the issue of private plaintiffs - as opposed
to congressional plaintiffs suing in their official capacity for injury
to their official authority.5 5  In Riegle, the District of Columbia
Circuit drew a sharp distinction between congressional and private
plaintiffs.'56 The court noted that "no distinctions are to be made
150. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
151. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 880, 881.
152. Id. at 881.
153. See infra text accompanying note 188.
154. Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1184 (Bork, J., concurring).
Political question, like standing, is a doctrine that raises a jurisdictional bar to
judicial power, while remedial discretion.., raises no bar and grants the judiciary
unfettered discretion to hear a case or not, depending on the attractiveness of the
idea.
My colleagues' disinclination to rest this case upon a jurisdictional ground
- whether that of standing or political question - rests squarely upon the
erroneous notion, expressed in Riegle and reiterated today, that there must be
judicial power in all cases and that doctrines must not be adopted which might
frustrate that power.
Id.
155. Id. at 1183 (Bork, J., concurring).
156. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 877, 878.
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between congressional and private plaintiffs in the standing analy-
sis."' 57  Nonetheless, the court drew a distinction between
congressional plaintiffs and private plaintiffs by requiring the
former to seek remedy from their colleagues, while allowing the
latter to go directly to the courts.'58 The rationale the court gave
for this distinction was the conclusory statement that "a private
plaintiff's suit would not raise separation-of-powers con-
cerns . . ."I" However, Judge Bork's concurrence in Vander
Jagt,16° his dissent in Barnes v. Kline, 61 and Judge (now Justice)
Scalia's concurrence in Moore v. United States House of Representa-
tives'62 adequately demonstrate that "a private plaintiff's suit
raises identical separation-of-powers concerns because those
concerns are about the relationship of the courts to Congress
,,163
In Skaggs v. Carle,"6 the district court dismissed the suit
brought by the private plaintiffs challenging House Rule XXI,
claiming that
[t]he voters' claim here is entirely derivative .... To allow the
presence of token voter-plaintiffs to sustain an action such as
this, and a fortiori to allow the Member-plaintiffs to invoke
their own status as voters to the same end, is an all-too-facile
expedient to circumvent the doctrine of equitable discretion,
and to subvert altogether the holdings of the line of discretion-
ary abstention cases .... 165
This derivative-claim approach to private plaintiff suits only high-
lights "the ad-hoc ery of 'remedial discretion.""' This approach
also undermines a significant prong of the remedial discretion test
first enunciated in Riegle. In that case, the court noted that
"[t]here is no general requirement that a private litigant employ
self-help before seeking judicial relief. Nor should there be,
because an ordinary plaintiff, having suffered an injury in fact
157. Id. at 877.
158. Id. at 881.
159. Id.
160. See Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1177-85.
161. 759 F.2d 21, 41-71 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
162. 733 F.2d 946, 956-65 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring).
163. Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1184.
164. 898 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-5323 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 1995).
165. Id. at 12.
166. Moore, 733 F.2d at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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within the contemplation of the law he invokes, is entitled to his
day in court."' 67
In two subsequent cases the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected the private plaintiff requirement proffered in Riegle.1"
The court modified the remedial discretion doctrine, stating that "if
a legislator could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators
through the legislative process itself, then it is an abuse of discre-
tion for a court to entertain the legislator's action."169 Moreover,
the court noted that the prong of the Riegle test for remedial
discretion dealing with private plaintiffs was flawed:
[T]here is a more fundamental difficulty with Reigle's non-
binding observations about the role of private plaintiffs.
Specifically, the separation-of-powers concerns informing the
doctrine of equitable discretion are, upon reflection, entirely
unaffected by the ability of a private plaintiff to bring suit. As
Riegle itself recognized, those concerns are implicated by the
judiciary's resolution of issues that are appropriately left to the
legislative arena. The ability (or not) of a private plaintiff to
sue implicates an entirely distinct matter - the role of the
federal courts in adjudicating non-frivolous claims of constitu-
tional violations.170
The District of Columbia Circuit again shifted positions on the
issue of private plaintiffs, however, when it undertook to decide the
merits of a challenge to the internal procedure of the legisla-
ture. 7' The court illustrated the absolute power retained by the
judiciary under the remedial discretion doctrine in Michel v.
Anderson when it held: "It appears to us, however, that it is
unnecessary to struggle with the [remedial discretion] doctrine
since, however construed, it has no applicability to private voters.
.. . The remedial discretion doctrine, therefore, cannot be
employed to bar a private citizen's claim over which we have
jurisdiction." '72 This type of vacillating on a key factor of the
doctrine as enunciated in Riegle demonstrates the weakness of the
concept. More importantly, several panels of the District of
167. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 878 (quoting McGowan, supra note 94).
168. Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Melcher v. Federal Open
Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
169. Melcher, 836 F.2d at 565.
170. Id. at 564.




Columbia Circuit have specifically urged that the District of
Columbia Circuit en banc or the Supreme Court reject the
doctrine:"'
Several members of this court have previously expressed
concern over whether equitable discretion represents a "viable
doctrine upon which to determine the fate of constitutional
litigation." Those concerns, which all members of this panel
share, continue to trouble us. As a panel, however, we are of
course bound faithfully to follow and apply, the law of our
circuit.174
The prudential doctrines discussed above are "founded in
concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the
courts in a democratic society." '175 While separation of powers
limitations on the role of the judiciary are important in stand-
ing,176 ripeness, 177 and remedial discretion178 analysis, the polit-
ical question doctrine addresses all of the separation of powers
considerations raised by a suit challenging legislative rules of
procedure without the limitations of the doctrines previously
discussed.
C The Political Question Doctrine
"Courts and commentators have long recognized that it is
crucial to distinguish questions about whether judicial power
exists, from questions about whether judicial power should be
exercised.
179
In addition to the concepts of ripeness and standing, the
political question doctrine has been developed by the Supreme
Court in order to prohibit the judiciary from meddling in matters
that courts are not competent to decide. The doctrine was first
utilized in Luther v. Borden."s Chief Justice Taney, writing for
173. Humphrey, 848 F.2d at 214; Melcher, 836 F.2d at 565 n.4.
174. Humphrey, 848 F.2d at 214 (quoting Melcher, 836 F.2d at 565 & n.4).
175. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
176. See VanderJagt, 699 F.2d at 1179 (Bork, J., concurring); Van Tatenhove, supra note
11, at 624.
177. Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2485, 2495 n.18 (1993) ("We have
noted that ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and
from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.").
178. See Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
179. Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1170 (Bork, J., concurring).
180. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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the Court, refused to consider whether a particular government
established in Rhode Island during the Dorr Rebellion met the
requirements of the Guaranty Clause of the Constitution."'
Although the doctrine has been applied relatively infrequently by
the Supreme Court in refusing to decide the merits of a case,"
the doctrine remains a viable method of restraining judicial
power.' 83 The Supreme Court recently gave resounding approval
to the doctrine in Nixon v. United States.*84 In that case the
Court held that the power to try impeachments was textually
committed to the Senate, and the judiciary had no power to
interfere with the method by which the Senate conducted impeach-
ment trials. 5 Justice Souter, concurring in judgment, wrote:
Whatever considerations feature most prominently in a
particular case, the political question doctrine is essentially a
function of the separation of powers .... existing to restrain
courts from "inappropriate interference in the business of the
other branches of Government," . . . and deriving in large part
from prudential concerns about the respect we owe the political
departments.' 86
In Baker v. Carr"8 the Supreme Court set forth six factors
that a court should consider in determining whether it should
refrain from hearing a case, even if the plaintiffs have standing: (1)
"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
[to a] coordinate political department"; (2) "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the case]";
(3) "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determi-
nation of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"; (4) "the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
181. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). See
generally J. Peter Mulhem, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
97, 102-04 (1988).
182. Mulhern, supra note 181, at 102-08.
183. But see Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Political
Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303 (1996) (arguing that standing has superseded the
political question doctrine as the appropriate method of dealing with separation of powers
issues).
184. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 252-53 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495
U.S. 385, 394 (1990)).
187. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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government"; (5) "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made"; or (6) "the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question."'" When a court is presented with
a case alleging a generalized injury, the court should consider
deciding the case on prudential grounds rather than under Article
III."8 In any case, the factors laid out in Baker v. Carr counsel
courts to exercise restraint and avoid "repeated and essentially
head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the
representative branches of government ....
1. Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment to a
Coordinate Political Department.- This Article does not contend
that legislative rules of procedure are always beyond judicial
review. The Supreme Court established more than 100 years ago
in United States v. Ballin 91 that legislative rules in some situations
are subject to judicial review for their constitutionality 92 To .say
that the judiciary may review legislative rules in certain instances
is not to say, however, that such review is appropriate in all
instances. 93 The question should not be whether legislative rules
generally are above judicial scrutiny, but whether the legislative
rule in question is beyond the competence of the federal judicia-
ry.1
94
188. Id. at 217.
189. See Van Tatenhove, supra note 11, at 624-25 n.139 (citing David A. Logan, Standing
To Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37, 42 (1984)). But
cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992) (asserting that Article III
standing limits the ability of Congress to allow suits based on broad, generalized injuries (i.e.,
citizen suits)).
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available
grievance about government - claiming only harm to his and every citizen's
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that
no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large - does
not state an Article III case or controversy.
Id. at 573-74.
190. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188
(1974) (Powell, J. concurring)).
191. 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
192. See id. at 5 (recognizing that Congress "may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights ....").
193. See Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1170 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
823 (1983).
194. See Metzenbaum v. Federal Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C. Cir.
1982). In Metzenbaum the court held that Article I, Section 5, Clause 2, of the Constitution
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A distinction should be drawn between those rules that affect
only the internal operations of Congress, that is, the method by
which legislation is enacted, and legislative rules that affect persons
other than members of Congress.19 While adoption of the
former is textually committed to Congress, the latter is usually the
proper subject of judicial review. 9 6 The Court has not hesitated
to actively police legislative rules that implicate the rights of
individual citizens outside of the legislative process. In United
States v. Smith1" the Court explicitly recognized the distinction
between rules that affect only the internal operations of the Senate
and rules that have an impact on individuals outside of Con-
gress.19 Smith involved a Senate rule that allowed the Senate to
reconsider a confirmation after it had approved the President's
nomination to federal office."' The Court reasoned that it had
the power to review the Senate rule, stating, "As the construction
to be given to the rules affects persons other than members of the
Senate, the question presented is of necessity a judicial one."
20°
The Court reached a similar result in Christoffel v. United
States.2° In that case, the Court examined the House rules and
determined that the House had violated its own rules of operation,
thereby denying the defendant due process and leading to the
defendant's conviction for perjury.' The Court was careful,
committed to Congress the power to determine the rules of its own internal proceedings,
even though in certain instances the legislative rules may be subject to judicial review. Id.
195. See id.
196. See id. In some situations even legislative rules that affect persons other than
members of Congress are not subject to judicial review. In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S.
224 (1993), the Supreme Court held that legislative rules governing the manner of trying
impeachments before the Senate was a nonjusticiable political question because the
Constitution gave the Senate the sole power to try impeachments. See id. at 232-34.
197. 286 U.S. 6 (1932).
198. Id. at 33.
199. Id. at 30 (interpreting Senate Rules XXXVIII and XXXIX).
200. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
201. 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
202. Id. at 90. In Christoffel the defendant appeared before a House committee to
answer to an allegation that he was a Communist. Id. at 85. At the beginning of the
committee session, a quorum of the committee members were present. Id. at 86. The
defendant contended that during the course of the hearing, and in particular when he was
alleged to have made his perjurious statements to the committee, less than a quorum of
committee members were present. Id. at 87. Presence of a quorum was an indispensable
part of the offense. Id. The Court was faced with the question of whether a quorum was
sufficient at the time the committee convened or whether a quorum had to be physically
present at the time the offense was committed. Id. at 90. The Court held that the absence
of a quorum at the time the statements were made not only violated Congress's own rules
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however, to distinguish between its power to review congressional
rules when the rights of an individual are at stake and its power
generally to supervise rules of congressional proceedings. The
Court observed that "[c]ongressional practice in the transaction of
ordinary legislative business is of course none of our concern
,,203
The conclusion that Article I, Section 5 commits to Congress
alone the power to determine its internal rules of procedure is
reinforced by the lack of judicially manageable standards for
deciding majority rule cases. As the Court in Nixon v. United
States2°4 observed:
[T]he concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political
department is not completely separate from the concept of a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may
strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable
commitment to a coordinate branch.2 5
2. Lack of Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Stan-
dards.- If the judiciary were to strike down House Rule XXI, it
would never be able to extricate itself from the task of determining
when a legislative rule violates the majority rule principle. To
allow members of Congress, or even individual voters, to challenge
legislative rules may have the effect of turning the principle of
majority rule upon itself and allowing the minority truly to
tyrannize the majority. After the legislature has "given its sanction
to legislation, and implicitly the process followed in its enactment,
a minority might yet frustrate its implementation through litigation
but also violated the defendant's due process right to receive a trial on every element of the
offense charged against him. Id.
203. Id. at 88 (emphasis added); see also Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 143 (1963)
(White, Clark, Harlan, Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
Article I, section 5, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides that "Each House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings." The role that the courts play in
adjudicating questions involving the rules of either house must of necessity be a
limited one, for the manner in which a house or committee of Congress chooses
to run its business ordinarily raises no justiciable controversy. However, when the
application or construction of a rule directly affects persons other than members of
the house, "the question presented is of necessity a judicial one."
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
204. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
205. Id. at 228.
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based on purported violations of 'housekeeping' rules., 20 6  This
is a particular danger when so many of the legislative rules that
help facilitate the orderly consideration of legislation have
antimajoritarian effects. Strong antimajoritarian tendencies exist in
the committee structures of both the House and the Senate;2t in
House Rule XXVII, requiring two-thirds of the House to concur in
order to suspend the rules and pass legislation;2° in the House
discharge rule, requiring an absolute majority of 218 members to
force a committee to discharge legislation;2° and in the rules
regarding filibuster and cloture in the Senate.2 10 To some degree,
each of these rules may be distinguished from House Rule XXI on
the ground that they affect the intermediate stages of legislation;
Rule XXI, however, affects final passage." Nevertheless, if the
courts agree to hear challenges to Rule XXI, they will be asked
repeatedly by individuals or legislators who are unhappy with the
disposition of legislation to set aside that outcome so that they can
get a second chance to obtain the result they seek. This is the very
danger that the political question doctrine was designed to avoid.
As Judge Bork observed:
Courts do not understand - indeed, probably not all legislators
understand - how the various rules, customs, and practices of
the legislature interact and how changing one aspect could
produce the most unexpected distortions of the legislative
process elsewhere. Nor can I imagine that extensive trials
would educate courts to become experts on legislative processes
206. Metzenbaum v. Federal Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
207. See Page v. Dole, No. 93-1546 (JHG), slip op. at 15-16 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1994)
(discussing how Senate committee structure causes vote dilution).
208. House Rule XXVII, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
209. House Rule XXVII(3), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
210. Senate Rule XXII.
211. The distinction between final passage and intermediate stages in the political process
is an insufficient basis for distinguishing Rule XXI from other legislative rules that have
supermajority properties because it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine which rules
effect final outcome and which are only intermediate rules. Cloture provides an excellent
example. If the Senate can obtain cloture and cut off debate, the bill may pass by a simple
majority. It is impossible, however, for the bill to pass by a simple majority if sixty percent
of the quorum cannot agree to cut off debate. Therefore, cloture effectively affects final
passage of legislation. See generally Howard H. Baker, Rule XXII: Don't Kill It, WASH.
POST, Apr. 27, 1993, at A17; Lloyd Cutler, On Killing Senate Rule XXII (Cont'd), WASH.
POST, May 3, 1993, at A19; Lloyd Cutler, The Way To Kill Senate Rule XXII, WASH. POST,
Apr. 19, 1993, at A23; Thomas Geoghegan, In the Senate, the Dole Filibuster Busts the
Designs of the Founding Fathers, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1994, at Cl; George F. Will, The
Framers' Intent, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1993, at C7.
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so that they could improve those processes. The task, if there
is a task that needs doing, is one for political reform by those
intimately familiar with the complex arrangements and interac-
tions involved.212
In Vander Jagt v. O'Neill,23 the District of Columbia Circuit
illustrated the danger of the judicial branch interfering with rules
that govern the structure of Congress. In Vander Jagt the court
was faced with a challenge to the allocation of members of the
House to committee seats. 214 In particular, the plaintiffs, Repub-
lican representatives and their constituents, alleged that their
representation in the House as a whole did not accurately reflect
their representation on particular committees."' Although the
court invoked the doctrine of remedial discretion, it recognized that
to give plaintiffs relief would not reflect the respect for a coordi-
nate branch of government that the doctrine of separation of
powers requires.216  The court did not refuse to grant relief
because it could not fashion a remedy; rather, the court felt that
fashioning a remedy would require nearly constant judicial
supervision of Congress. 2"7 The District of Columbia Circuit
found this notion "'startlingly unattractive' . . . , given our respect
for a coequal branch of government ... "218
Judge Bork's concurrence, although based on standing grounds
rather than remedial discretion or the political question doctrine,
demonstrates even more clearly the dangers of allowing the
judiciary to police the internal rules of Congress:
219
Appellants' complaint invites federal courts to participate exten-
sively in the internal processes of Congress. We should decline
the invitation because of the consequences of accepting it. If an
allegation of a diminution of influence on the legislative process
were sufficient to confer standing, federal courts doubtless
212. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1182 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1167.
215. Id. (alleging that although Republicans constituted 44.14% of the whole House, they
received only 40% of the seats on the Budget and Appropriations Committees, 34.29% of
seats on the Ways and Means Committee, and 31.25% of the seats on the Rules Committee).
216. Id. at 1175-76.
217. Id. at 1176, 1177 n.27.
218. VanderJagt, 699 F.2d. at 1176 (quoting Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 123 (9th Cir.
1977)).
219. See id. at 1177 (Bork, J., concurring).
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would be invited to rule upon the ways in which committee and
subcommittee members are chosen, since party lines aside, it is
clear that those chosen for committees on the budget or foreign
affairs or rules generally have more influence than those not so
chosen. Perhaps we could be called upon to rule on filibusters,
since those who filibuster may have disproportionate influence
over legislative outcomes. Courts might be asked to control the
order in which legislation is brought to the floor, debated, and
voted on. Surely we would be requested to remedy dispropor-
tionate assignments of staff as between committee majorities
and minorities, for those assignments affect influence on the
legislative process. Examples of this sort could be multiplied,
but perhaps enough has been said to indicate why federal courts
should firmly refuse to enter upon the wholly inappropriate task
of ensuring absolute equity in Congress's legislative procedures.
It is absurd to think that courts should purge the political
branches of politics.22°
While the opinion of Judge Bork may be characterized merely
as a parade of horribles,22' his characterization of the dangers of
reviewing legislative rules of procedure is not so far-fetched. The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia has
already been presented with a challenge to the filibuster.2
Skaggs v. Carle2" offers the judiciary another opportunity to
impose its view of proper procedure on Congress. In addition,
House Rule XXVII, requiring two-thirds of the House to concur in
order to suspend its rules and pass legislation,224 presents issues
similar to those in Skaggs. The House discharge rule,2z requiring
an absolute majority of 218 members to force a committee to
discharge legislation, could be challenged on a somewhat different,
although analogous, ground. Potential plaintiffs, who were not able
to get legislation that they favored discharged from committee,
could allege that the requirement of an absolute majority for
220. Id. at 1181 (emphasis added).
221. Cf. id. at 1176 (noting that "in an extensive discussion (that gives new meaning to
the phrase 'parade of horribles'), Davids spelled out how disastrously intrusive it would be
if we were to accept appellant's invitation to restructure congressional committees") (citing
Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 124-25 (9th Cir. 1977)).
222. See Page v. Dole, No. 93-1546 (JHG) (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1994); see also supra notes
109-16 and accompanying text (discussing Page decision).
223. 898 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-5323 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 1995).
224. House Rule XXVII, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
225. House Rule XXVII(3), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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discharge violates the Constitution's requirement that "a Majority
of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business., 226
Finally, as Judge Bork pointed out, "there are more than
considerations of comity and respect here, more than historical
tradition and the constitutional need to retain limits on judicial
power. ,227 More fundamentally, courts do not have the compe-
tence to determine the appropriate interplay of legislative rules:
"There is the very real problem of a lack of judicial competence to
arrange complex, organic, political processes within a legislature so
that they work better."2" Judge Bork goes on to observe that,
"The institutions of a secular, democratic government do not
generally advertise themselves as mysteries. But they are.
What they do, how they do it, or why it is necessary to do what
they do is not always outwardly apparent. Their actual
operation must be assessed, often in sheer wonder, before they
are tinkered with, lest great expectations be not only defeated,
but mocked by the achievement of their very antithesis.
229
For these reasons, the courts should refrain from reviewing
legislative rules that do not impose direct and particularized injury
on individual plaintiffs. To say, however, that
a particular rule falls within the set of those questions effective-
ly outside the reach of the judiciary does not necessarily require
the conclusion that the rule is above scrutiny for constitutional
compliance.'
[W]e have to divest ourselves of the common misconception
that constitutionality is discussable or determinable only in the
courts, and that anything is constitutional which a court cannot
or will not overturn. We ought to understand, as most senators
and congressmen understand, that Congress's responsibility to
preserve the forms and the precepts of the Constitution is
greater, rather than less, when the judicial forum in unavailable,
as it sometimes must be."3
226. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
227. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1182 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
228. Id.
229. Id. (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTtNUrrY 2 (1971)).
230. Van Tatenhove, supra note 11, at 626.
231. Id. at 626-27 n.145 (quoting C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 23-24
(1974)); see also John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in




It appears that the Framers of the Constitution contemplated
that a majority of representatives should control all decisions of the
House, except when the Framers felt that special protection was
required. House Rule XXI offends this principle of majority rule
because it allows forty-one percent of the representatives to
prevent legislation or extract disproportionate concessions for their
votes. Yet, despite this apparent constitutional violation, congress-
men and voters must seek their relief in the legislature and not the
courts. To allow the courts to review this type of claim would open
an entire gambit of legislative rules of procedure to judicial
scrutiny: "[I]t is, of course, precisely the function of the Article III
limitations on jurisdiction, through such doctrines as standing and
political question, to ensure that nonfrivolous claims of unconstitu-
tional action will go unreviewed by a court.""2
While United States v. Ballin 3 and other cases recognize that
not all legislative rules are shielded from judicial scrutiny, cases
subsequent to Ballin tend to support the conclusion that only when
an individual person has a particular injury caused by a legislative
rule can the courts intervene. The plaintiffs challenging House
Rule XXI fail to meet this requirement. Even if the plaintiffs are
able to show that the tax legislation, which they support, failed to
pass the House because of Rule XXI, their claim is insufficient to
invoke review by the courts. It involves an attack on the legislative
process and not a claim of injury to a private individual.
Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 established a scheme by which
each house of Congress could determine its internal rules of
procedure without involving the other house or the President.'
If the rulemaking clause
had granted to the executive or the judiciary the authority to
impose procedural rules on Congress, it would have created not
a check on power but rather a control of one branch by
another. A similar spectre is presented by allowing an assertion
232. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1183 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
233. 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
234. Normally legislation must go through bicameralism and presentment. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7 (establishing procedure for bills to become law).
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of power by the judiciary, limited only by self-restraint, to
impose its interpretation of those rules on Congress. 35
This is the very danger that the doctrine of separation of powers,
as applied through standing and the political question doctrine, is
intended to prevent.
235. Van Tatenhove, supra note 11, at 627.
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